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abstract.  As technologies change and the scale of human activity grows, so too does the law. 
The surge of oil and gas production in the United States, spurred by hydraulic fracturing in shale 
formations, has fomented a sea change in oil and gas law, substantially infusing this area with 
more complex environmental and property principles. Widespread demands for legal and policy-
based solutions to the environmental and social impacts of oil production and fracking have trans-
formed the field from one focused on maximizing fossil fuel production into one of environmental 
conservation. This is dramatically demonstrated by sweeping Colorado legislation in 2019, 
changes to the common law of oil and gas by local governments and landowners, and the extension 
of procedural environmental protections and state constitutional environmental rights to the oil 
and gas realm. Collectively, though not uniformly, a spectrum of changes to state statutes and 
common law has rendered an expansive reshaping of oil and gas law that amounts to a legal revo-
lution.  
introduction 
The United States is now the world’s top producer of oil and gas, outpacing 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the other fossil fuel giants. This is a stark economic 
change, reversing decades of concerns about dependence on imports. But this 
trend has also wrought substantial changes in oil and gas governance, particu-
larly as domestic fossil fuel development has expanded into populous areas. In 
one of the most dramatic examples of the collision between residential land use 
and oil and gas development, the area around Denver, Colorado hosts both one 
of the fastest-growing human populations and a similarly fast-growing drilling 
operation, with over 23,000 wells in Weld County alone.1 And Fort Worth, Texas 
1. Troy E. Swain, Weld County Oil & Gas Update April 2018: Active Wells, Drilling Permits, Pro-
duction, Rig Count, Trends, https://www.weldgov.com/UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File 
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has more than 2,000 producing wells.2 In these and other areas, hydraulically 
fractured wells regularly appear in the middle of neighborhoods and the back-
yards of schools. 
Urban and suburban drilling is by no means a new trend. As early as the 
1930s, oil and gas wells were prominent fixtures in places such as Houston, Texas 
and Long Beach, California.3 But as hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” enabled 
the drilling of thousands of new wells in the past decades, several of the largest 
drilling booms have caused major collisions of interests. Homeowners seeking 
the good life in places like Colorado’s Front Range are increasingly standing in 
vocal opposition to domestic companies that pursue highly productive oil and 
gas reserves.4 And in some cases the homeowners have won. In 2019, Colorado 
enacted a new statute that empowers local governments to regulate numerous 
impacts of oil and gas development and requires broader state regulation of en-
vironmental externalities from oil and gas production.5 
The collision of human and fossil fuel interests has dragged oil and gas gov-
ernance from a once-sleepy area of dusty books to the front lines of legal debates. 
For more than half a century, U.S. oil and gas law focused almost exclusively on 
the conservation of oil and gas resources, ensuring that when companies drilled 
wells, they would extract as much oil and gas from the ground as possible.6 The 
/Departments/Planning%20&%20Zoning/Oil%20and%20Gas/Updates/Oil%20%20Gas 
%20Update%20APR%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6CL-QLHF]. 
2. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, Fracking as a Test of the Demsetz Property Rights Thesis,
71 HASTINGS L.J. 845 (2020) (using Colorado as an example of the human oil and gas con-
flict); Gas Well Status, CITY OF FORT WORTH, https://cfw.maps.arcgis.com/apps
/webappviewer/index.html?id=8487c19655cd40d08d57f64de3f4339f.
3. See Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 12 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D. Tex. 1935) (noting that in 1935 
“it became apparent” that an individual was leasing a large amount of acreage and planning
to drill); Historical Oil Operations, CITY OF LONG BEACH, http://www.longbeach.gov
/energyresources/about-us/oil/history [https://perma.cc/8D3E-2VWV] (counting 3,400 
“land based wells” drilled since 1932).
4. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 2, at 852-53 (discussing this conflict); Julie Turkewitz, In 
Colorado, a Fracking Boom and a Population Explosion Collide, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/colorado-fracking-debates.html [https://perma
.cc/5C24-6E36] (describing the conflict between a growing population and increasing num-
bers of wells).
5. Protect Public Welfare Oil and Gas Operations, S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2019), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/2019a_181_signed.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2ZB2-CK3C].
6. See Bruce M. Kramer, Basic Conservation Principles and Practices: Historical Perspectives and Basic 
Definitions, in FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS POOLING AND UNITIZATION 1 (2006) (“Early 
conservation regulation . . . was principally concerned with the prevention of waste in the 
physical sense of the term waste.”); Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (1952) (asserting that oil and gas conservation—the need to “make 
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goal of legislatures and courts was to ensure efficient production of what was 
nearly universally viewed, at least in oil and gas states, as a positive and highly 
lucrative commodity.7 Doctrines such as the “rule of capture” provided that any 
entity that drilled a legal well could drain others’ oil and gas without paying them 
damages.8 This rewarded those who were most motivated to drill and thus in-
centivized production. And state courts universally declared the mineral estate 
(oil and gas and other resources) to be dominant over the surface, allowing min-
eral owners to use the surface in any reasonable way necessary to produce oil and 
gas without paying the surface owner any damages.9 In the most notorious cases, 
oil and gas producers drained off surface owners’ entire water supply, main-
tained waste pits that splashed pollution directly onto surface owners’ homes, 
and damaged crops without providing surface owners any compensation; courts 
have deemed all of these actions legal.10 States, in turn, moderated the potential 
waste caused by oil companies racing to drill and drain each other’s oil, by re-
quiring wells to be spaced apart by minimum distances and limiting production 
to avoid rapid drainage of formations that would leave valuable resources stuck 
underground.11 
In less than a decade, this field of governance has undergone a sea change. 
Despite oil and gas law being highly diffuse due to its locus in the states, national 
changes in attitudes toward oil and gas development and its impacts have filtered 
down to the state and local levels. Homeowners, parents of children who attend 
maximum use of currently available reserves of oil and gas”—is “important to the welfare of 
the country”). 
7. See Tara K. Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, 2020 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 2-3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347353 [https://perma.cc/3PRA
-MXAM] (noting that the historic and ongoing role of state oil and gas regulatory agencies is 
“preventing waste and protecting correlative rights,” which are the rights of mineral owners 
to have an opportunity to produce oil and gas, and observing that “[t]he goals of conservation 
regulation and the tools available to commissions have changed little” since 1952).
8. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspec-
tive, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005) (describing the rule of capture as “an integral part of oil
and gas law since the completion of the first commercial oil well”).
9. Christopher M. Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much Accommodation Is Re-
quired Under Current Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 91 (2002) (observing that “[o]ne 
of the rights included in the mineral estate is the implied right of the mineral estate owner to 
use ‘so much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary for operation’” (quoting Union 
Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962))).
10. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810-12 (Tex. 1972) (allowing use of a 
farmer’s water); Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 651-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
(allowing the destruction of crops); Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202, 203 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919) (allowing oil and gas waste pits to spatter pollution onto an owner’s home);
Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (W. Va. 1950) (allowing for the destruction 
of crops).
11. Williams, supra note 6, at 1159-77 (describing state oil and gas conservation laws).
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schools near oil and gas development sites, environmental groups, and other 
stakeholders have vocally and persuasively called for states to take a broader view 
of oil and gas conservation law to encompass environmental conservation.12 
Many state oil and gas agencies now directly regulate the impacts of oil and gas 
development to prevent pollution of underground and surface water; reduce the 
noise, dust, light, and other impacts often complained of by neighbors to wells; 
and protect wildlife and other natural resources.13 This is not to say that the reg-
ulation is adequate from the perspective of some landowners and citizens’ 
groups, but it has changed substantially in response to concerns. Additionally, 
oil and gas law is a leading area of preemption debate. 
Many local governments, worried that states are not doing enough to regu-
late oil and gas, have taken matters into their own hands. States have limited the 
areas in which wells are allowed, implemented detailed environmental regula-
tions of their own, and often attempted to permanently ban or place moratoria 
on development.14 The response by most states has been to preempt this local 
revolution, but there are notable exceptions.15 The contrast in responses shows 
up most starkly in Texas and Colorado, which have both experienced some of 
the most substantial levels of urban and suburban drilling. The Colorado legis-
lature has enabled strong local control over oil and gas development,16 whereas 
Texas has substantially limited it.17 And finally, beyond preemption and local 
control issues, the recent oil and gas revolution has prompted courts to revisit 
 
12. See generally Righetti, supra note 7 (discussing changing public attitudes toward oil and gas 
development and new types of legal challenges). 
13. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-28 (2020) (requiring setbacks of wells from resi-
dences); 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(b)(3) (West 2012) (requiring wells to be 
setback 300 feet from wetlands greater than one acre in size); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13 
(2020) (mandating enhanced casing requirements, added in 2014 in an effort to prevent un-
derground water contamination from hydraulically fractured wells); W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-
12(a) (2011) (requiring setbacks of wells from residences); OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, STATE 
OF LA., ORDER NO. U-HS § 2(A) (2009), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/eng_div 
/20090806-U-HS.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EM-CET5] (requiring setbacks of wells from 
residences). 
14. See Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927, 
956-65 (2015) (exploring local regulatory provisions and bans); Hannah J. Wiseman, Dis-
aggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 303-04 (2016) (same). 
15. See Outka, supra note 14, at 966-75 (describing preemption trends and cases); Wiseman, supra 
note 14, at 306 (describing widespread preemption of local control over oil and gas develop-
ment). 
16. S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019). 
17. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 2015). 
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the rule of capture that allows unlimited drainage of oil and gas from property 
around the oil or gas well, causing a doctrinal split to emerge among the states.18 
This Essay explores the overall trend toward an oil and gas governance re-
gime increasingly focused on development risks and analyzes the growing diver-
gence of state responses. In doing so, it assesses the conditions that have chal-
lenged previously universal legal doctrines. Part I of this Essay examines recent 
changes in oil and gas conservation law that provide avenues for states, and in-
creasingly local governments, to prohibit rather than incentivize oil and gas pro-
duction. Part II then compares conflicting state responses to local control over 
oil and gas, documenting the primary trend of intrastate preemption and the 
unusual case of local-government autonomy in Colorado. Part III turns to the 
courts and property law, exploring how the boom in domestic oil and gas devel-
opment has forced courts to reconsider the age-old rule of capture and its asso-
ciated production incentives. Finally, Part IV analyzes how citizens have used ex-
isting environmental statutes, including requirements for government entities 
to review the impacts of their regulatory action, to push states and the federal 
government to regulate rather than foster oil and gas development. 
These changes represent, on the whole, a fundamental shift in oil and gas 
law and demonstrate the complex turns that it has taken. In an area of the law so 
dominated by state, not federal, control, the collective response has markedly 
shifted, but not universally so. As scholars of federalism would predict, courts 
and legislatures, facing disparate demands, histories, and political economic 
forces, have created a spectrum of new policies. And states such as California are 
considering changes similar to Colorado’s while industry pushes back in the 
courts, thus promising further policy experimentation and litigation as the field 
continues to evolve.19 
i .  reforming state oil and gas conservation laws 
In recent years, states have begun explicitly revising their oil and gas statutes 
to incorporate environmental principles. Colorado exemplifies this approach. In 
April 2019, Colorado’s legislature radically overhauled its state oil and gas con-
servation statute and regulatory agency,20 mandating a substantial turn toward 
 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See AB-345, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces 
/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB345 [https://perma.cc/R8G8-F72J] (proposing 
a comprehensive review of California’s oil and gas regulations to address environmental-jus-
tice gaps, increase setbacks from homes, schools, and other sensitive receptors, and to adopt 
new consultation requirements for oil and gas operations). 
20. See S.B. 19-181. 
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environmental conservation in a leading oil and gas state.21 Among other provi-
sions, the bill requires members of the oil and gas regulatory agency to have ex-
perience in land-use planning and “environmental protection, wildlife protec-
tion, or reclamation,” in addition to oil and gas experience.22 It also requires the 
state to minimize a variety of impacts from oil and gas development, such as air 
and water pollution,23 and it expressly grants local governments enhanced regu-
latory authority.24 This is a dramatic shift from the predominant oil and gas gov-
ernance approach in most states—and, indeed, from the approach in Colorado 
until 2019. 
Oil and gas production has been subject to state regulation since the early 
part of the twentieth century. States initially enacted laws to constrain the prof-
ligate waste that characterized oil and gas production and to assure that oil and 
gas resources were prudently and efficiently developed. Accordingly, early con-
servation efforts resulted in a patchwork of regulations that took the form of 
restrictions on inefficient end uses or the sale of oil and gas into glutted markets. 
These early statutes survived due process and other constitutional challenges, 
establishing the states’ right to regulate oil and gas production and constrain the 
rule of capture (a right to unfettered production from a legally drilled well) as 
necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare. Today, a majority of states 
has passed legislation creating state regulatory agencies for the purpose of con-
serving oil and gas and preventing physical waste. These statutes are designed 
to foster and encourage orderly production and to maximize recoverable re-
serves, while protecting the correlative property rights of other owners in the 
common pool. 
State oil and gas conservation agencies play a significant role in regulating 
oil and gas development activities on private and state land.25 The majority of 
states has created specific agencies that regulate upstream (at the well site) oil 
 
21. Colorado was the fifth largest producer of oil in January 2020, behind Texas, North Dakota, 
New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Monthly Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/production [https://perma 
.cc/476S-B9RR]. 
22. S.B. 19-181 § 9. 
23. Id. § 3. 
24. Id. § 4. 
25. See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. § 34-60-105 (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-6 (West 2020); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 17, § 52 (2020); 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 405 (West 2020); TEX. NAT. 
RES. CODE § 81.051 (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (2020); Patrick H. Martin, The 
Jurisdiction of State Oil and Gas Commission Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, in OIL 
AND GAS CONSERVATION LAW AND PRACTICE 3-1, 3-4, 3-5 (1985). The oil and gas regulatory 
sphere also includes federal and local actors, as well as state environmental regulatory agen-
cies. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1543, 
1561, 1589-90 (2014). 
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and gas development and operations including permitting, well locations and 
density, rates of oil and gas production, flaring (burning off natural gas that es-
capes from the well), water use and disposal, and fracking.26 These agencies play 
a critical role in determining the timing and intensity of oil and gas operations. 
Thus far, however, state oil and gas conservation law has done little to address 
growing awareness and concern regarding the localized health and environmen-
tal externalities of oil and gas development, local disenfranchisement, or land-
scape-scale impacts to ecosystems, wildlife, and climate systems.27 Although a 
number of state legislatures have made minor amendments to conservation stat-
utes in the 1990s and early 2000s to address growing environmental concerns,28 
the fundamental structure and purposes of conservation agencies have remained 
static. 
In recent years, however, state conservation agencies have pursued new rule-
makings related to statutory authorizations to protect health, safety, and the en-
vironment. Environmental advocates and landowners in communities with oil 
and gas development have exerted increased pressure on conservation agencies 
to limit the externalities of development.29 As a result, agencies have enacted new 
rules to create setbacks from homes, schools, public-recreation facilitates, and 
sensitive ecological areas.30 Conservation agencies verify compliance with sur-
face and environmental protections as part of the drill permit process.31 Agency 
rules have also addressed latent safety concerns and required additional 
 
26. COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:205, 404-1:317, 404-1:317B, 404-1:341, 404-1:608, 404-1:903, 404-
1:904, 404-1:906 (2020). 
27. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729 (2013) 
(highlighting some state regulatory changes but also substantial gaps in regulation). 
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (2013); 1995 Ill. Laws 3095; 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 1839. 
The scope of the text was litigated in Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 433 P.3d 
22 (Colo. 2019). 
29. In re Petition for Rulemaking Filed with the COGCC, Cause No. 1, Order No. 1-187 (May 29, 
2014), https://cogcc.state.co.us/orders/orders/1/187.html [https://perma.cc/HE6D-DJN6]; 
Railroad Commission Petitioned to Replace Local Oil and Gas Rules Threatened by House Bill 40, 
ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 7, 2015) https://www.edf.org/media/railroad-commission 
-petitioned-replace-local-oil-and-gas-rules-threatened-house-bill-40 [https://perma.cc 
/3A2L-CUM9]. 
30. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:604.a(2) (LexisNexis 2020); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.620(2) 
(2017); 55-3 WYO. CODE R. § 47(a) (LexisNexis 2020). 
31. See, e.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & REGULATIONS 1201-05 
(2020), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/LATEST/1200Series.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/76MA-DCRQ]; WYO. RULES & REGS. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, ch. 3, § 8 
(2020); id. § 47; Exec. Order No. 2019-3, App’x D (Wyo. 2019); COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVA-
TION COMM’N, FORM 2 (Aug. 2013), https://cogcc.state.co.us/forms/PDF_Forms/form2 
_20130806.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBN6-PV5C]. 
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monitoring and reporting of development activities that pose environmental and 
safety risks such as hydraulic fracturing and flowline abandonment.32 
State legislatures have also responded to the rising conflicts between residen-
tial development and oil and gas development by enacting new protections for 
split-estate surface owners. Where surface and mineral estates have been sev-
ered, early courts implied a general servitude on the surface estate, allowing the 
mineral owner reasonable use of the surface for development of oil and gas.33 
These rights included the rights to clear land, create drilling pads and waste pits, 
use surface and ground water, and house employees.34 At common law, the sur-
face owners were not entitled to any compensation for destruction of the surface, 
loss of income, or disturbance.35 However, embedded in the implied servitude 
was an obligation that mineral owners exercise their rights with due regard for 
the interests of surface owners. This obligation is one that state courts have ex-
panded into a doctrine requiring reasonable accommodation of existing surface 
uses.36 Despite some protection for surface interests under the common law, ac-
rimonious conflicts between surface and mineral owners continued, prompting 
legislative intervention. Beginning in the early 2000s, state legislatures began 
enacting laws that required notice to surface owners and payments for loss of 
use, damage, and disruption resulting from lawful mineral operations.37 Today, 
almost all major producing states, with the exception of Texas and California, 
 
32. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & REGULATIONS 1105a-g et seq. 
(2020). See generally COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & REGULA-
TIONS, Series 800-1200 et seq. (2019) (requiring the Commission to regulate noise, waste, 
and other environmental harms). 
33. See John S. Lowe, The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An Analysis of Its Rationale, 
Status, and Prospects, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 4.01, § 4.02. (1993); Richard T. Miller, 
A Mineral Owner’s Implied Rights to Use Surface Property Owned by Others, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. 
INST. 203, 205-08, 213-14, 216, 226 (2011). 
34. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
35. EOG Res., Inc., v. Turner, 908 So. 2d 848, 854-55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. 1985); Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 
103 (Tex. 1984). 
36. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); see Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phil-
lips, 511 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Ark. 1974); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 919 
(Colo. 1997); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979); Amoco Prod. Co., 
703 P.2d at 896; Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); Buffalo Mining 
Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980); Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 
776 P.2d 736, 740 (Wyo. 1989). 
37. See Christopher S. Kulander, Surface Damages, Site-Remediation and Well Bonding in Wyo-
ming—Results and Analysis of Recent Regulations, 9 WYO. L. REV. 413, 417-422 (2009). 
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have either some version of a surface-damage act or statutory requirements for 
accommodation.38 
Although they addressed some landowner concerns, split-estate statutes did 
not resolve community and local government concerns regarding the local exter-
nalities of oil and gas development. These externalities include air pollution, in-
jury to water quality or wildlife, and increased strain on housing and public ser-
vices, among others.39 Whereas split-estate acts provided statutory remedies to 
property owners owning the immediately overlying real property, they did not 
address concerns of neighbors and municipalities. And although tort law pro-
vides some redress, local governments were largely preempted with respect to 
regulation of the industry.40 In response, communities sought to regulate or limit 
development through land-use restrictions, and voters made use of ballot initi-
ative and petition processes to amend state conservation statutes.41 These efforts 
were largely unsuccessful at structurally altering oil and gas conservation laws, 
but they precipitated legislative action. 
Colorado’s legislative overhaul of its Oil and Gas Act in Senate Bill 19-181 
takes the next step in reforming oil and gas conservation governance to align 
with changing political, social, and judicial opinions regarding oil and gas ex-
ploration.42 This law repeals, adds, and amends the language of sixteen existing 
Colorado statutes related to the regulation of oil and gas, including those for the 
Colorado Air Quality Control Commission, Oil and Gas Conservation Commis-
sion, and local governments.43 Collectively, these changes offer a new paradigm 
of oil and gas conservation regulation, one that prioritizes protection of the en-
vironment and regulation of the industry, redefines waste to permit nonproduc-
tion, requires multiagency coordination around environmental and wildlife 
 
38. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-72-214, -216 to -219 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-127(1)(d) 
(2018); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/6(B) (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595 
(West 2018); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 82-10-504 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-12-5 (West 
2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-420 to 113-425 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 38-18-07 (2018); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.2-.9 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4.1 (2018); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 60-1-604 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-21 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-
3(a)(1) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-405 (2018). 
39. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Taxing Local Energy Externalities, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (describing these and other impacts). 
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
41. See Tara K. Righetti, Contracting for Sustainable Surface Management, 71 ARK. L. REV. 367, 397 
(2018) (explaining how both private and public landowners use lease to manage conflicts over 
the impact of development). 
42. S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019). 
43. S.B. 94-177, 59th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. ch. 317, at 1978 (Colo. 1994); H.B.07-1298, 66th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. ch. 312, at 1328 (Colo. 2007); H.B. 07-1341, 66th Gen. Asemb., ch. 
320, at 1357 (Colo. 2007). 
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impacts, and creates space for shared governance of oil and gas with cities and 
counties. 
S.B. 19-181 makes its turn toward environmental conservation explicit, shift-
ing the principal purpose of Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act to regulation of the in-
dustry for protection of the environment.44 This change, referred to as the “Mis-
sion Change” in documents of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (COGCC), requires a comprehensive “realignment and reform of 
commission rules.”45 In a shift that mirrors the requirements of some environ-
mental procedure statutes, S.B. 19-181 authorizes the commission to consider 
cumulative impacts and alternative locations for wells, to require public com-
ment on sensitive locations, and to consider mitigation without regard to cost-
effectiveness or technical feasibility.46  
Recognizing that oil and gas may not be produced as a result of these new 
rules, S.B. 19-181 also revises its statutory definition of waste to exclude nonpro-
duction of oil and gas necessary to protect public interests in “health, safety, and 
welfare, the environment or wildlife resources.”47 Traditionally, conservation law 
has treated the prevention of waste—avoiding a well that leaves some oil and gas 
underground—as paramount over almost all other concerns.48 The goal of reg-
ulation has principally been to maximize production of the resource and to 
 
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(I) (West 2020); Mission Change Whitepaper, COLO. OIL & 
GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION (Nov. 1, 2019), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents 
/sb19181/Rulemaking/Mission%20Change/Mission_Change_Rulemaking_Whitepaper 
_20191101.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY83-6JAG]. 
45. Mission Change Whitepaper, supra note 44, at 1. 
46. S.B. 19-181 §§ 12, 16; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(5.5)(b) (West 2020) (noting that 
the phrase “minimize adverse impacts,” as used in the Colorado Code, includes “those impacts 
that cannot be avoided”). Rulemaking to implement these new requirements is currently on-
going, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) released draft Straw-
dog 800, 900, and 1200 Series Mission Change Rules on May 1, 2020. Hearings on the mission 
change, cumulative impacts, and alternative site locations rulemakings are tentatively sched-
uled for August 24, 2020 to September 10, 2020. Press Release, Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation 
Comm’n, Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission Announces SB 19-181 Rulemaking 
Plan (Apr. 29, 2020), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/media/Press_Release_RM_& 
_PC_Update_April_Hearing_20200429.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ53-ADTQ]. Public com-
ments on the straw dog mission change rules and other proposed rules developed in response 
to SB 19-181 can be submitted on the COGCC’s website. See Senate Bill 19-181 Public Com-
ments, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, https://cogcc.state.co.us/sb19181.html 
#/public_comments [https://perma.cc/ALW7-PFVD]. 
47. COLO. REV. STAT. 34-60-103(11)(B) (West 2020). 
48. Sw. Kan. Royalty Owners Ass’n v. State Corp. Comm’n, 769 P.2d 1, 9 (Kan. 1989) (“Preven-
tion of waste is the primary purpose of the gas conservation laws.” (citation omitted)); Denver 
Producing & Refining Co. v. State, 184 P.2d 961, 964 (Okla. 1947); Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Con-
servation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 779 (Wyo. 1982) (“[P]revention of waste is of primary im-
portance.”). 
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prevent actions that could render portions of the resource unrecoverable.49 Alt-
hough courts and some conservation agencies have shown a willingness to con-
sider environmental impacts as part of a waste calculus in limited contexts,50 
Colorado’s new statute reconceptualizes the commons regulated by the COGCC 
as one that includes, and in fact prioritizes, protection of the environment. This 
change introduces the possibility that the commission could prohibit drilling in 
areas where development was deemed to pose an unreasonable risk notwith-
standing that the underlying resources would be unrecoverable.51 
Colorado’s amended Oil and Gas Conservation Act also expands the regula-
tory landscape and takes a multilevel approach to regulation of oil and gas de-
velopment. It reallocates authority between the oil and gas conservation agency, 
the Department of Environmental Quality, and local governments. This reallo-
cation democratizes the regulation of oil and gas development by, for example, 
adopting inclusive consultation requirements.52 The statute also rejects preemp-
tion of local regulation and expressly imbues local governments with the right 
to regulate certain surface impacts of production, including, for example, noise 
and aesthetic impacts. The act also authorizes or directs local governments and 
other agencies to enact regulations for some aspects of oil and gas production, 
creating the possibility of concurrent and overlapping regulatory jurisdiction.53 
The COGCC is currently working with the Department of Health and Environ-
ment and local governments to ensure that these regulations are complementary 
and do not impede the goals of other programs.54 
 
49. Cf. Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1219-20 (1938). 
50. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(a)(1) (2018)); Michigan Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 276 N.W.2d 141, 146-47 (Mich. 
1979). 
51. The authors speculate that mineral owners and producers who are prohibited from drilling 
under the nonproduction rule and thus experience total loss or damage to their correlative 
rights could challenge the statute as creating a regulatory taking, though it is unclear whether 
such claims would be successful. For a discussion of takings law and production bans, and an 
argument that a takings challenge to a ban would not be successful, see, for example, Kevin J. 
Lynch, Regulation of Fracking is Not a Taking of Private Property, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 39 (2016). 
In 2020, legislation was introduced and ultimately defeated in Colorado that proposed to cre-
ate statutory liability for losses to fair market value as a result of local government fracking 
bans. See H.B. 1070, 2020 Leg. Sess. (Colo. 2020). 
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106 (2020). Current rulemakings proposed by Commission staff 
suggest that the application process would be amended to facilitate consultation through a 
prefiling notice procedure. See 300 Series Master Draft, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COM-
MISSION (Mar. 15, 2020), https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1GNO 
_gWnY3dIKSPsE3OUK6A4EybA5eQkr [https://perma.cc/83SJ-GNX3]. 
53. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-109(10)(a) (West 2020). 
54. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mike Freeman, Chair Pro-Tem, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Weld 
Cty. and Jeff Robbins, Dir., Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n (Sept. 3, 2019), 
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The new Colorado approach to oil and gas regulation upends the traditional 
frameworks of top-down state regulation designed to maximize production of 
petroleum resources. Instead, it creates new pathways for more comprehensive 
regulation of oil and gas activities with a focus on surface and environmental 
impacts. The statute expressly recognizes that, at times, protecting these inter-
ests and limiting adverse externalities will require the prohibition of oil and gas 
development and resultant nonproduction of oil and gas. As Colorado counties, 
agencies, and local governments pursue new rulemaking pursuant to the 
changed law, they are reshaping the energy regulatory landscape and developing 
a new model of oil and gas conservation. 
i i .  local governance and intrastate preemption: a shift 
toward local empowerment? 
Colorado’s S.B. 19-181 does more than fundamentally change the landscape 
of state regulation of oil and gas. The decision of the Colorado Legislature to 
expressly imbue local governments with relatively broad authority over oil and 
gas development also brings oil and gas federalism into a new space.55 Like other 
relatively powerful leaps in the evolution of law, however, it builds upon a long-
simmering community regulatory movement. For nearly a century, local govern-
ments have sought to use their regulatory powers to address the externalities of 
oil and gas development, which used to be quite extreme.56 Many local govern-
ments have issued regulations including, for example, restrictions on the loca-
tion of wells, mandatory-minimum setbacks between oil and gas wells and 
buildings, and requirements for the posting of bonds—money that the city can 




referral [https://perma.cc/SU4R-BACK]. For an example of coordination between the Colo-
rado Department of Public Health and Environment and the Colorado Oil and Gas Conser-
vation Commission, see Memorandum from Jeff Robbins, Dir., Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation 
Comm’n (Jan. 22, 2020), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Policies/NTO_Notice 
_To_Surrounding_Building_Occupants_20200128.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA2K-GLHE], 
which illustrates how the COGCC enhanced review of all permits for locations within two 
thousand feet of building units. 
55. See, e.g., Paul D. Tanaka & Jonathan E. Kidwell, Passage of Senate Bill 19-181: New Era of Change 
and Uncertainty for Oil and Gas Operations in Colorado, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.kirkland.com/-/media/publications/alert/2019/03/passage-of-senate-bill-
19181-new-era-of-change-and.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PA4-27GJ] (noting that the bill “em-
powers communities to regulate oil and gas in a way they never could before”). 
56. See, e.g., Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 12 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D. Tex. 1935) (address-
ing regulation of oil and gas development in South Houston, Texas). 
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an abandoned well.57 Other local governments, such as Fort Worth and Arling-
ton, Texas have promulgated detailed ordinances that address numerous aspects 
of oil and gas development.58 Still other communities have negotiated with in-
dustry to mitigate the impacts of development or pay for damages. A growing 
number of governments have also banned oil and gas drilling or fracking en-
tirely, or have at least tried to do so.59 Not all of these local efforts have been 
successful, however, largely due to states’ opposition to local control. 
Colorado’s S.B. 19-181, which empowers local control over oil and gas, is 
largely unprecedented because the dominant trend of states has been to preempt, 
not empower, local action. In the first and most common form of preemption, 
oil and gas producers have used existing state oil and gas preemption statutes to 
argue that a local ordinance addressing oil and gas development is invalid. In-
deed, several states have long had laws that broadly prohibit local “regulation” 
of oil and gas activity. Courts have interpreted state statutes as preempting local 
bans on drilling near drinking water supplies,60 requirements for posting of fi-
nancial assurances as bonds,61 procedures for permitting wells and hearing citi-
zen complaints,62 requirements for site restoration,63 and local zoning re-
strictions relating to the location of oil and gas wells.64 Only a distinct minority 
of state courts, exemplified by the approach of New York’s highest court, has 
held that the term “regulation” does not cover all local efforts to control the ef-
fects of oil and gas development,65 including, for example, land-use regulation 
that addresses where development may occur, or banning it altogether from the 
local government’s territory. 
 
57. See, e.g., Outka, supra note 14, at 942-47 (exploring the contours of local oil and gas regula-
tions). 
58. Arlington, Tex., Ordinance No. 19-031 Ordinances Governing Gas Drilling and Production in 
the City of Arlington, Texas (May 21, 2019), https://arlingtontx.gov/UserFiles/Servers 
/Server_14481062/File/City%20Hall/Depts/City%20Secretary/City_Code_of_Ordinances 
/GasDrilling-Chapter.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RNZ-GC6G]; Fort Worth, Tex., Ordinance 
No. 18449-02-2009 (Feb. 3, 2009), https://publicdocuments.fortworthtexas.gov 
/CSODOCS/PDF/8bda91aa-b534-4417-a672-3b306bfc5db2/Ordinance%2018449-02-2009 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ5F-A8NR]. 
59. See Dana & Wiseman, supra note 2, at 28-30 (discussing communities’ memoranda of under-
standing with industry). 
60. Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 297, 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2005). 
61. Range Res. Appalachia v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 872, 875, 877 (Pa. 2009); Ohio ex rel. 
Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 131-32 (Ohio 2015). 
62. Range Res. Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 871; Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 133. 
63. Range Res. Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 871; Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 132. 
64. Morrison, 37 N.E.3d at 132-33. 
65. Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E. 3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014). 
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Through a second preemptive avenue, oil and gas operators challenging local 
ordinances in court have also persuaded the courts that state legislation impliedly 
preempts local oil and gas ordinances despite the lack of express preemptive lan-
guage. In Colorado, New Mexico, and West Virginia, for example, courts deter-
mined that local bans or long-term moratoria on oil and gas development con-
flicted with state regulation, which allowed or even encouraged oil and gas 
development.66 
Legislatures in some states have also enacted new legislation to expressly 
block local control over oil and gas development. After voters in the Town of 
Denton, Texas banned hydraulic fracturing through a referendum, the legisla-
ture and governor responded by preempting nearly all local control over the 
practice.67 Oklahoma quickly followed suit, fearing that its local governments 
would similarly impede oil and gas development.68 
Colorado therefore offers a stark contrast to the overwhelming trend toward 
state preemption of local control, but the road to this conclusion was a decidedly 
rocky one. There have been numerous preemption battles in the Colorado courts 
involving questions of the extent of local control over oil and gas development. 
Each case has provided only incremental answers. The Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the state had not expressly preempted local land-use controls 
over oil and gas development or impliedly occupied the field.69 But the court also 
established that local governments could not fully ban oil and gas develop-
ment,70 although they could continue to regulate this development, within lim-
its.71 Local governments in Colorado subsequently continued to regulate oil and 
gas development and test the boundaries of these decisions, with four local gov-
ernments banning or placing five-year moratoria on fracking. The Colorado 
 
66. Swepi, LP v. Mora Cty., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1193 (D.N.M. 2015); City of Longmont v. Colo. 
Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Colo. 2016) (concluding that “the state’s interest in the 
efficient and responsible development of oil and gas resources includes a strong interest in the 
uniform regulation of fracking”). 
67. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 2015). 
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 52-137.1 (2015). 
69. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc. 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992). 
70. Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Colo. 1992). 
71. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. BDS Int’l, LLC, 159 P.3d 773, 777 (Colo. App. 2006) (prohibiting local 
fines or bonding requirements, among other requirements, for oil and gas development); 
Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 765 (Colo. App. 2002) (prohibiting local 
regulation of the technical aspects of oil and gas development); see also Katherine Toan, Not 
Under My Backyard: The Battle Between Colorado and Local Governments Over Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 26 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27-55 (2015) (describing the 
history of the battle between state and local control in Colorado and the many court decisions 
that addressed state preemption of local oil and gas regulation). 
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Supreme Court concluded that these efforts impermissibly conflicted with state 
law.72 
As oil and gas local preemption cases wound their way through the Colorado 
courts, political activity in this area also erupted—with some of it directly con-
nected to litigation.73 Citizens, therefore, took to the ballot box, in several failed 
attempts to revise the Colorado Constitution to allow for more local control. In-
dustry attempted to curtail this control.74 Efforts by a governor-appointed state 
task force to reconcile these competing views were largely unsuccessful.75 But 
after the election of a pro-environmental Democratic governor in 2018, the Col-
orado Legislature passed, and the governor signed, sweeping legislation that 
gives local governments relatively extensive power to regulate oil and gas devel-
opment.76 This development starkly contrasts with the trend toward preemption 
in other states. The move toward strong localized control over oil and gas devel-
opment in a major producing state might portend a broader shift toward local 
governance in this legal field. 
The full impact of Colorado’s bill remains to be seen, as communities enact 
ordinances under their newly confirmed powers and industry challenges various 
applications of the bill and communities’ interpretation of its meaning. But the 
bill has already meaningfully changed the nature of local oil and gas law and the 
state/local regulatory balance in this area. And at least one state, California, has 
considered following in Colorado’s footsteps.77 If regulatory diffusion leads 
more states to adopt similar measures, the seemingly unrelenting trend toward 
preemption of local control over oil and gas operations could weaken. 
 
72. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016); City of 
Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Colo. 2016). 
73. William E. Sparks & Malinda Morain, Usurping Democracy and the Attempts to Ban Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 5 LA. ST. U. J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 313, 325-26 (2017) (describing a 2012 legis-
lative effort to give local governments more local control). 
74. Id. at 336-37 (describing industry groups’ and citizen groups’ efforts to amend the Colorado 
Constitution, with four amendments proposed when the Longmont case was pending—two in 
favor of local control, and two against it); Id. at 338 (describing two citizen attempts to amend 
the Colorado Constitution in favor of more local control in 2016, both of which failed). 
75. Id. at 337; Toan, supra note 71, at 54-55. 
76. 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 502; Judith Kohler, Gov. Jared Polis Ushers in New Era of Drilling Regu-
lation, but Are “Oil and Gas Wars” Over?, DENVER POST (April 17, 2019, 2:48 AM), https:// 
www.denverpost.com/2019/04/16/colorado-oil-gas-bill-signed-gov-jared-polis [https:// 
perma.cc/A8BR-HRRH]. 
77. California has amended its oil and gas conservation act to shift its mission towards greater 
protection of the environment and to require consultation with other agencies “in furtherance 
of the California Global Warming Solutions Act.” 2019 Cal. Stat. 771. The Act’s stated purposes 
include “protecting public health and safety and environmental quality, including reduction 
and mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the development of hydrocarbon 
and geothermal resources in a manner that meets the energy needs of the state.” Id. 
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i i i .  oil  and gas property rules:  a move towards small 
landowner rights 
The rise of fracking and associated oil and gas development in many U.S. 
states has not just pushed the boundaries of oil and gas federalism as communi-
ties have demanded more control. It has also sparked debates between individual 
property owners and the oil and gas industry. These debates have led to a doc-
trinal split among state courts. All oil and gas development occurs in shared 
“fields” or reservoirs, areas of underground rock with similar geologic character-
istics at similar depths. In traditional oil and gas reservoirs, when one person 
drilled a well into the rock and began producing oil or gas, this well drained the 
area around the well. If another person happened to own some of the oil and gas 
in the drainage radius, conflicts ensued. When disputes arose, courts’ universal 
and largely unquestioned conclusion was that this drainage should be allowed.78 
This conclusion made sense: if courts policed such disputes, endless questions 
would emerge as to who owned how much of the oil and gas produced, and who 
owed whom payments for the drained resources. Allowing drainage with no re-
quirement for compensation, in contrast, encouraged those drillers who were 
most motivated to produce oil and gas to pursue their interest—thus, in the 
courts’ view, supporting a productive money-making enterprise. Courts in all 
fifty states established a similar form of this “rule of capture,” which protected 
entities who drilled a legal well from having to pay other owners of oil and gas 
whose resources were drained by that well.79 States developed a variety of con-
servation laws to counter the wasteful drilling practices encouraged by the rule 
of capture, but the rule held fast in courts. 
This fundamental doctrine began to show signs of cracking in 2008. In 
Coastal Oil v. Garza, a mineral-owning family in Texas challenged an oil and gas 
company’s decision to extend hydraulic fractures (cracks in a rock formation) 
into the family’s property, which drained off approximately one third of the fam-
ily’s natural gas, valued at nearly a half million dollars.80 The family argued that 
this was a trespass for which the company should pay damages. Unlike a legal 
well, the family asserted, hydraulic fracturing was more akin to a slant well—a 
well unlawfully drilled into someone else’s property, which is not protected by 
the rule of capture.81 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed: it concluded that hy-
draulic fracturing was different from a slant well and was protected by the rule 
 
78. See, e.g., Kramer & Anderson, supra note 8, at 899 (describing the long-held rule of capture). 
79. Id. 
80. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 6-9 (Tex. 2008). 
81. Id. at 13-14. 
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of capture.82 A strong partial dissent questioned this conclusion, emphasizing 
the majority’s failure to adequately acknowledge that the rule of capture only 
applies to legally drilled wells and questioning the majority’s efforts to distin-
guish hydraulically induced fractures from slant wells.83 
Following the Garza case, owners of minerals in West Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania challenged similar practices to those followed in Texas. These challenges 
similarly involved the extension of fractures into other mineral owners’ proper-
ties to drain off the natural gas.84 Acting under diversity jurisdiction, a federal 
court in West Virginia sided with the drained landowner and explicitly followed 
the partly dissenting opinion in Garza.85 The court emphasized that oil and gas 
development that applies hydraulic fracturing to very dense shales is different 
from traditional development, in which natural drainage occurs.86 In shales, oil 
and gas cannot be produced simply by drilling a well and allowing the oil or gas 
to flow up the well due to natural pressures in the underground formation. Ra-
ther, for shales, a company has to physically crack open the rock to extract the oil 
and gas.87 The court accordingly concluded that the rule of capture does not ap-
ply to unconventional oil and gas formations like shales. It further emphasized 
that if it did, it would give powerful oil and gas companies a license to steal from 
relatively poor landowners who lacked the resources to drill their own wells and 
prevent drainage.88 A lower court in Pennsylvania agreed with this reasoning,89 
but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the Garza majority.90 
Although only three states have formally addressed this issue, fracking 
promises to further upend long-established property doctrines in oil and gas 
such as the rule of capture as landowners continue to question whether old rules 
should apply verbatim to new practices. 
 
82. Id. at 14. 
83. Id. at 43-44 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
84. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397, at *1 (N.D.W.V. 
Apr. 10, 2013). 
85. Id. at *6. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at *5. 
88. Id. at *5-6. 
89. See Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), vacated and remanded, 
224 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2020). 
90. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2020). 
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iv.  extending environmental procedural statutes and 
rights to the oil and gas realm 
The transformation of oil and gas law has occurred through many avenues—
some more direct than others. In some cases, policymakers have enacted sweep-
ing changes to the statutory status quo.91 But much of the change within the 
field has been more circuitous. One of the major indirect approaches has been 
the extension of federal and state environmental review requirements to the oil 
and gas realm. Although these procedural statutes do not mandate particular en-
vironmental outcomes, requiring federal and state agencies to consider in depth 
both the environmental and social impacts of approving oil and gas wells and 
associated infrastructure and less damaging alternatives can cause agencies to 
change their mind. In some cases, these procedural requirements can delay pro-
jects so substantially that developers ultimately cancel them. This Part explores 
the widespread extension of environmental procedural statutes to oil and gas law 
at the federal and state levels. In the state context, it also analyzes the use of sub-
stantive rights to environmental protection, embodied within some state consti-
tutions, to limit oil and gas activity. 
A. Federal Procedural Protections: Applying the National Environmental Policy 
Act to Oil and Gas Activity 
Environmental groups have been increasingly effective at leveraging the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),92 a procedural statute, to provide de 
facto regulation of the oil and gas industry. Most directly, they have convinced 
several courts to force the federal government to consider the environmental ex-
ternalities, including carbon emissions, of oil and gas development on federal 
land. Courts have also asked the federal government to indirectly consider, and 
potentially constrain, oil and gas development in its environmental reviews of 
oil and gas pipelines. Although “merely” procedural, these court victories for en-
vironmental groups may foment substantive change, potentially setting a blue-
print for a new President—if inclined toward environmental protection—to use 
unilateral executive authority to constrain the oil and gas industry on both fed-
eral and state lands. 
 
91. See, e.g., S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019). 
92. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2018)). 
the new oil and gas governance 
69 
In the past three years, a growing number of courts have invalidated fossil 
fuel leases approved by the federal government on federal lands,93 demanding 
that the government reconsider the approval and complete more NEPA re-
views.94 Many of the early cases asked the government to consider the climate 
impact of mining more coal that would eventually be burned, emitting carbon 
dioxide.95 But those cases have now been extended to demand that the govern-
ment consider the effects of new oil and gas leasing on oil use around the 
world.96 As these suits have become more successful—invalidating regional 
management plans that allow leasing, or environmental reviews supporting leas-
ing in Montana, New Mexico,97 Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado98—environmen-
tal groups and concerned states have expanded the reach of litigation. In recent 
 
93. The lease is the economic agreement most often used by a resource owner such as the federal 
government or a private property owner. See James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas 
Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389, 398-406 (2020) (explaining why resource owners generally lease their 
land rather than selling it); Righetti, supra note 41, at 383-84 (explaining how both private 
and public landowners use lease to manage conflicts over the impact of development). 
94. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires the government to produce “envi-
ronmental impact statements (EISs) whenever [it] propose[s] major federal actions that 
would significantly affect the quality of the human environment.” Richard Lazarus, The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the 
Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1509-10 (2012). When a judge finds that this environmental re-
view was inadequate, the normal remedy is to invalidate the approval. See James W. Coleman, 
Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 299 (2019). 
95. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1233-38 (10th 
Cir. 2017); W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21 GF-BMM, 
2018 WL 1475470, at *13 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018); see also Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our 
Env’t v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enf’t, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1213 (D. Colo. 
2015), vacated as moot, 643 F. App’x 799 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing the emissions’ effect on 
“ambient air quality”). 
96. See, e.g., San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1243-44 
(D.N.M. 2018). 
97. Id. at 1256 (setting aside New Mexico oil and gas leases). 
98. WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 63-79 (D.D.C. 2019) (addressing Wyo-
ming, Utah, and Colorado leasing); W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *13 (evalu-
ating a Wyoming resource management plan for coal, oil, and gas); Wildearth Guardians v. 
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 2104760, at *3 (D. Mont. 
May 1, 2020); Pamela King & Hannah Northey, Trump’s Efforts to Spur Projects Hit NEPA Wall, 
E&E NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060148569 
[https://perma.cc/FKF4-SEL8] (“A federal court, for example, last month struck down the 
Bureau of Land Management’s climate review for a set of Obama-era Wyoming oil and gas 
lease sales. One week later, a Colorado district court tossed an analysis President Obama’s 
BLM performed and Trump’s BLM finalized for energy development in the North Fork Val-
ley.”). 
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years, they have filed new challenges to oil and gas development in Montana,99 
Colorado,100 the Gulf of Mexico,101 Utah,102 and California.103 
Federal courts have also asked the federal government to account for the im-
pact of oil and gas production and consumption when considering oil and gas 
pipeline permits. For example, a Montana district judge held that the Keystone 
XL pipeline that would bring heavy oil from Canada to the United States re-
quired further review to consider whether its greenhouse-gas impacts may have 
changed during the ten years in which it has been reviewed by the federal gov-
ernment.104 In addition, the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) had to consider the impact of burning more natural 
gas before approving a natural-gas pipeline.105 
Despite recent successful extensions of NEPA to oil and gas, the Trump ad-
ministration’s current efforts to change NEPA’s implementing regulations may 
somewhat undercut environmental groups’ reliance on the statute.106 The ad-
ministration is seeking to narrow the kinds of impacts that must be considered 
in a NEPA review. This would include eliminating consideration of cumulative 
impacts,107 which have been a weakness of several of the climate reviews the ad-
ministration has performed.108 Consideration of cumulative impacts were one 
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reason that the administration’s approval of the Keystone XL pipeline was struck 
down.109 And the administration is proposing to drop separate consideration of 
“indirect” and “direct” impacts, relying instead on a single definition of what 
effects it will consider.110 That change, however, may not have a large impact on 
climate cases. For example, the FERC gas-pipeline case turned on the same 
standard of causation that the Trump administration is proposing to adopt: ef-
fects that are “reasonably foreseeable.”111 
 Federal courts’ increased supervision of oil and gas impacts through their 
review of federal leasing and pipelines may serve as a template for a new admin-
istration eager to influence state oil and gas policy. Former Vice President Joe 
Biden, for example, has made sweeping promises to ban oil and gas development 
on public lands.112 A new President might refuse to grant new permits for any 
project—any new drilling on federal lands or any pipeline—without a full NEPA 
analysis. Almost all pipelines cross some rivercourse or creekbed that could count 
as “federal waters” even under the revised definition. Therefore, NEPA reviews 
could be imposed even on small, intrastate pipelines.113 A full NEPA review, 
known as an Environmental Impact Statement, now takes over five years on av-
erage,114 and even once it is completed, it would be difficult to force a reluctant 
administration to issue new permits. 
On the other hand, the extension of relatively detailed federal environmental 
review to oil and gas production and other parts of the supply chain has not been 
universal. Courts have often held that pipeline companies need not consider the 
upstream impacts—expanded oil and gas drilling as a result of pipeline construc-
tion—or downstream effects of burning gas from the pipeline in their NEPA 
analysis.115 But environmental groups have also scored notable victories: the 
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growing compendium of cases requiring more careful review of the effects of oil 
and gas development has commenced a small but growing trend toward more 
detailed environmental review of oil and gas projects.   
B. State Environmental Review Requirements 
State statutory environmental procedural requirements modeled on NEPA 
and constitutional environmental rights provisions have also provided new ave-
nues to require states to consider or limit the environmental impacts of oil and 
gas production. Advocates have used these requirements to draw attention to 
environmental externalities of oil and gas development, to limit degradation of 
national resources, and to encourage regulation of this development. 
In the 1970s, a number of states adopted environmental procedural require-
ments, mandating that state agencies consider the environmental impacts of cer-
tain state-approved projects or actions. Impacts considered in these reviews in-
clude air quality, community impacts, noise, pollution, road damage, and 
groundwater contamination, among others. Though based on NEPA, state en-
vironmental procedural statutes differ with respect to the categories and magni-
tude of state actions subject to review.116 In many states, decisions regarding oil 
and gas permitting are subject to some or all state environmental procedural re-
quirements. For instance, state environmental procedure acts have been applied 
to require review of decisions by the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation Bureau of Oil and Gas Permitting and Management,117 oil 
and gas decisions by a county and the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Re-
sources (DOGGR) in California,118 and the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Con-
servation.119 The required environmental review may encourage orderly plan-
ning, adverse impact mitigation, and public engagement. But, as in the federal 
realm, it may also come at a significant cost or cause project delays. 
In response to concerns about the statewide impacts of rapidly expanding 
technologies such as hydraulic fracturing, state legislatures and advocates have 
turned to environmental procedure acts to help them understand the potential 
impacts of the changing industry. California added statutory provisions requir-
ing DOGGR to prepare a new environmental impact report in the absence of any 
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proposed project.120 New York recognized that its prior general environmental 
impact study of oil and gas activities did not adequately analyze the impacts of 
multi-well pads and high-volume hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale. As 
a result, it issued a moratorium on drilling permits and, after finalizing a seven-
year review process culminating in preparation of a supplemental generic envi-
ronmental impact statement, adopted a statement of findings prohibiting high-
volume hydraulic fracturing in New York.121 
Plaintiffs have achieved limited success bringing judicial challenges based on 
the adequacy of county and agency decisions and environmental analyses. 
Courts evaluate the adequacy of state environmental impact analyses according 
to statutory judicial review standards, including those for administrative pro-
ceedings.122 These standards tend to be deferential to agency decisions123 and 
thus, judicial review is unlikely to favor plaintiffs challenging state environmen-
tal analyses.124 Thus far, examples of oil and gas decisions which have been re-
manded or reversed based on state environmental procedure statutes are scarce. 
However, a number of environmental plaintiffs have challenged state environ-
mental reviews of oil and gas and used these processes to argue for more com-
prehensive reviews including indirect impacts and programmatic reviews. With 
only one recent exception,125 they have not been able to overcome strong judicial 
deference. For instance, in California, litigants were unsuccessful in advocating 
that the DOGGR was required to consider indirect impacts caused by the 
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additional oil and gas development made possible by well stimulation.126 In 
Montana, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that the Environmental 
Policy Act requires programmatic assessments of oil and gas leasing decisions or 
consideration of environmental impacts during the coal-leasing phase.127 De-
spite limited success to date, a recent victory in California should provide plain-
tiffs with some encouragement. The California Court of Appeal’s decision in 
King & Gardiner Farms v. County of Kern to set aside Kern County’s certification 
of an environmental impact report’s findings and conclusions, and the county’s 
approval of an oil and gas zoning ordinance,128 indicates that if plaintiffs con-
tinue to hammer away at the fortress of judicial deference, they are likely to even-
tually find a sympathetic forum. 
State constitutional environmental rights provisions and environmental 
rights statutes may also provide environmental advocates, concerned landown-
ers, and local governments with avenues to challenge state regulation of oil and 
gas development and associated permitting activity. The Alaska, Pennsylvania, 
Montana, Illinois, Virginia, Hawaii, and Texas constitutions all include some 
versions of environmental rights language that require the state to protect public 
interests in natural resources.129 Pennsylvania’s provision further creates a con-
stitutional public trust over state natural resources.130 While some state consti-
tutional environmental rights provisions have faded into relative obscurity, oth-
ers have elevated the right to a clean environment to be on par with other 
fundamental rights.131 Though once regarded as aspirational,132 in some states 
these provisions have served as the basis for enacting new regulations on oil and 
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gas activities,133 upholding the state’s police power to regulate oil and gas,134 as-
sessing cumulative impacts of offshore development,135 and granting standing 
to communities to challenge state actions that could degrade environmental 
quality.136 In other states, statutory environmental rights provisions expressly 
grant individuals and local governments the right to sue to protect natural re-
sources from destruction.137 These statutes and state constitutional provisions 
have been used to enjoin development that would adversely impact the environ-
ment and natural resources,138 though they have been less successful in cases 
concerning individual projects with principally local impacts.139 
Although instances where environmental procedural statutes or environ-
mental rights provisions have wholly invalidated laws or development decisions 
are rare, they indicate the potential power of these statutes and constitutional 
protections to shape regulation of the oil and gas industry. Where earnestly ap-
plied, environmental analyses can help remedy information gaps, empower com-
munities, reinforce norms of environmental protection, and evoke trust princi-
pals. As such, in addition to their procedural function, these statutes have 
provided new pathways for advocacy, at times delaying projects and encouraging 
property owners and concerned citizens to pursue legislative change. 
conclusion 
Oil and gas law is no longer lodged within the stodgy world of royalty frac-
tions and complicated rules for spacing out wells to ensure maximum drainage 
of oil and gas from underground formations. Indeed, the past decade of boom-
ing development has caused a sea change in all areas of oil and gas governance, 
from state regulation and property rules to the balance between state and local 
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control in this area. To be sure, like all revolutions, this one is tied to particular 
jurisdictions while others resist or reject these new trends. Colorado has paved a 
new path toward explicit environmental oil and gas regulation—a stark transi-
tion from the tendency of state oil and gas law to foster oil and gas develop-
ment—and California may follow suit.140 But other states with long histories of 
oil and gas development and booming petroleum economies, and which lack the 
extensive conflicts between people and wells that have arisen in Colorado, re-
main anchored in more traditional regulatory approaches. And although a fed-
eral court in West Virginia has held that oil and gas companies may not use frack-
ing to take oil and gas from nearby property owners, courts in Texas and 
Pennsylvania disagree.141 Further, whereas some states have used extended en-
vironmental review requirements to oil and gas operations, other states lack 
these requirements altogether. 
It is too early to declare that oil and gas law is now an environmental legal 
field. Indeed, given the state-level dominance of this governance area, and the 
range of state politics and culture, oil and gas regulations and legal doctrines are 
unlikely to ever converge upon one approach. But the recent S.B. 19-181 in Col-
orado—a state that enjoys substantial economic advantages from oil and gas de-
velopment—shows the dramatic turn in oil and gas governance toward a more 
environmental approach. And the willingness of a federal court to declare, at 
least for West Virginia, that fracking does not give oil and gas companies a li-
cense to steal from relatively poor neighboring landowners, is a direct rejection 
of the long-followed rule of capture, which previously allowed for largely unfet-
tered development of oil and gas. 
Oil and gas governance will always remain a legal field unto itself. As a 
pooled underground resource, for which surface access is required for develop-
ment, thorny oil-and-gas-specific property questions will continue to arise. But 
environmental legal principles have already crept substantially into the field—
and explicitly so in Colorado—showing how national social movements can in-
fluence even a highly decentralized legal field. 
 
Tara Righetti is Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming and director of the 
academic program in Professional Land Management in the School of Energy Re-
sources. JD, University of Colorado. I am grateful to Connor Thompson (JD 2020) for 
his excellent research assistance, and to the editors and staff of the Yale Law Journal 




140. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra Part IV. 
the new oil and gas governance 
77 
Hannah Wiseman is a Professor of Law at Penn State Law in University Park 
and Professor and Wilson Faculty Fellow in the College of Earth and Mineral 
Sciences at Penn State. JD, Yale Law School. 
 
James W. Coleman is an Associate Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University’s 
Dedman School of Law. 
